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We report on a complete free-space field implementation of a modified Ekert91 protocol for quan-
tum key distribution using entangled photon pairs. For each photon pair we perform a random
choice between key generation and a Bell inequality. The amount of violation is used to determine
the possible knowledge of an eavesdropper to ensure security of the distributed final key.
Introduction. Proposals for quantum key distribution
(QKD) were first published over two decades ago [1, 2, 3].
In particular, the protocol of Bennett and Brassard in
1984 (BB84) sought to distribute a random encryption
key via correlated polarization states of single photons
[1, 3]. Its strength was derived from the no-cloning
theorem [4, 5] which states that the state of a single
quantum system cannot be copied perfectly. A measure-
ment attempt on the distributed key is revealed as errors
in the expected correlation of the measurement results.
BB84 must treat all noise as evidence of an eavesdropper.
Whether a completely secure key can then be distilled
after error correction [6] depends only on the fraction of
errors in the initial key.
The ‘quantum’ nature of QKD was explored from a dif-
ferent angle in 1991 when Ekert proposed an implementa-
tion using non-local correlations between maximally en-
tangled photon-pairs [7]. The quality of entanglement
between a photon-pair can be measured by the degree of
violation of a Bell inequality [8]. Maximally entangled
photon-pairs have perfect correlations in their polariza-
tion states, and violate the Clauser-Horne-Shimony-Holt
(CHSH) version [9] of this inequality with the maximum
value. The defining feature in Ekert91 is the suggestion
to use the degree of violation of the CHSH inequality as
a test of security. This conjecture is related to the con-
cept later known as the monogamy of entanglement [10]:
the entanglement between two systems decreases when a
third system (for example, the measurement apparatus
of an eavesdropper) interacts with the pair.
Although BB84 and Ekert91 utilize different aspects of
quantum mechanics, once one writes down explicitly the
expected qubit states and the measurements that should
be performed, the two protocols turn out to generate
the same set of correlations [11]. When these calcula-
tions were extended to include error correction and pri-
vacy amplification, a quantitative link was found between
Eve’s information (assuming individual attacks) and the
amount of violation of the CHSH inequality [12], thus
vindicating Ekert’s intuition. BB84 and Ekert91 came
to be considered as fully equivalent. In this perspec-
tive, the choice between a prepare-and-measure and an
entanglement-based implementation is dictated only by a
balance of practical benefits. For instance, BB84 involves
an active choice when encoding the logical bits 0 and
1 into the polarization states, requiring a trusted high-
bandwidth random number source [13]; in comparison,
no active choice is necessary with entanglement-based
QKD. Besides its ability to remove the need for ran-
dom number generators [14], technical difficulties related
to the lack of practical true single photon sources can
be avoided. The price of entanglement-based QKD is a
lower key generation rate due to the limited brightness of
contemporary entangled photon-pair sources when com-
pared with faint coherent pulse approximations of single
photon sources.
Recently two theoretical developments pointed to the
fact that BB84 and Ekert91 may not be equivalent after
all. The first such development are the proofs of uncon-
ditional security developed by Koashi and Preskill [15]
and improved by Ma, Fung and Lo [16]. These authors
proved that the security of entanglement-based imple-
mentations can be based on the sole knowledge of the
error rate, because this quantity already contains infor-
mation about the imperfection of the source — while
such imperfections (e.g. the photon-number statistics, or
spectral distinguishability of different letters [17]) must
be carefully taken into account in prepare-and-measure
schemes [18, 19, 20]. The second development is due to
Ac´ın and coworkers [21]. These authors went back to
Ekert’s original idea of basing the security only on the
combined correlation function S for violating CHSH and
derived the formula
IEve = h
(
1 +
√
S2/4− 1
2
)
, (1)
with the binary entropy h(x) = −x log2(x) − (1 −
x) log2(1 − x). This formula provides an unconditional
security bound under the same assumptions as in [16]; it
also guarantees partial security in a more paranoid sce-
nario, in which the QKD devices are untrusted (we shall
come back to this issue in the conclusions).
In this paper, we describe an entanglement-based QKD
experiment in which we monitor the violation of the
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FIG. 1: Orientation of different detector polarizations. Coin-
cidences (1,1’) and (2,2’) are used for key generation, while
coincidences between any of (3,4,5,6) and any of (1’,2’,3’,4’)
will be used for testing a CHSH inequality for various settings.
CHSH inequality and use (1) to quantify the degree of
raw key compression in the privacy amplification step.
Typically, implementations of entanglement-based QKD
systems do not monitor Bell inequalities [14, 22, 23]; in
one of the first experiments [24], a Bell-type inequality
was monitored, but no quantitative measure of security
was derived from the observed violation.
Experiment. We implement a modified Ekert91 pro-
tocol [25] that uses a minimal combination of three de-
tection settings a0, a1, aK on one side, and two distinct
detection settings b0, b1 on the other side for performing
polarization measurements on a photon-pair in a singlet
state |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|HAVB〉 − |VAHB〉). The setting pair
(aK , b0) corresponds to horizontal/vertical polarization,
and should lead (in the absence of noise) to perfectly
anti-correlated measurement results which form the raw
key. The setting b0 and the other ones are used to check
the violation of the CHSH inequality |S| ≤ 2 with
S = E(a0, b0) + E(a0, b1) + E(a1, b0)− E(a1, b1) .(2)
The correlation coefficients E are determined from the
number nij of coincidence events between detectors i on
one side and j on the other side, collected during a given
integration time T . Measurement bases are chosen such
that a maximal value of |S| = 2√2 would be expected.
Basis b1 is chosen to correspond to ±45◦ linear polar-
ization, and bases b, c need to form an orthogonal set
corresponding to ±22.5◦,±67.5◦ linear polarizations (see
Fig. 1). With that, we evaluate for example
E(a0, b0) =
n3,1′ + n4,2′ − n3,2′ − n4,1′
n3,1′ + n4,2′ + n3,2′ + n4,1′
, (3)
and the other coefficients in (2) accordingly from an en-
semble of pair detection events.
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FIG. 2: Experimental setup. Polarization-entangled photon
pairs are generated via parametric down conversion pumped
by a laser diode (LD) in a nonlinear optical crystal (BBO)
with walk-off compensation (WP, CC) into single mode opti-
cal fibers (SMF). A free-space optical channel for one detec-
tor set (Bob) is realized using small telescopes on both sides
(ST, RT). Spectral filtering is implemented with a pinhole
(PH) which is imaged completely onto the active area of the
photodetectors with a relay lens (R) through a spectral filter
(F). Both parties perform polarization measurements in bases
randomly chosen by beam splitters (B1-B3), and defined by
properly oriented wave plates (H1-H3) in front of polarizing
beam splitters (PBS) and photon counting detectors. Photo
events are registered separately with time stamp units (TU)
connected to two PC linked via a classical channel.
The random choice of measurement bases is performed
with a combination of polarization-independent beam
splitters (B1-B3, see Fig. 2), with a 50:50 splitting ratio.
This avoids an explicit generation of a random number by
a device. The base settings corresponding to the angles
shown in Fig. 1 are adjusted by appropriately oriented
half wave plates (H1-H3).
The remaining elements of the experimental setup
are similar to a previous experiment implementing an
entanglement-based BB84 protocol [14]. Polarization-
entangled photon pairs are generated in a compact diode-
laser pumped non-collinear type-II parametric down con-
version process [26] with efficient collection techniques
into single mode optical fibers [27, 28]. We pump a 2mm
thick β-Barium Borate (BBO) crystal at a wavelength of
407nm with a power of 40mW and observe a photo co-
incidence rate of about 18000 s−1 in passively-quenched
silicon avalanche photodiodes directly at the source. We
separate the two measurement devices by ≈ 1.5 km in
an urban environment, introducing a link loss of about
3 dB caused primarily by atmospheric absorption at the
down converted wavelength of 810nm and transmission
fluctuations.
Background light suppression (at night) was accom-
3plished using a spatial filter (PH) in the receiving tele-
scope (acceptance range Ω = 6.5 · 10−9 sr) and a color
glass filter (RG780) with a peak transmission of ≈ 90%
for the down-converted light at 810 nm.
Correlated photons are identified by recording their
time of arrival at each detector and running a cross cor-
relation of the timing information on both sides (similar
to the scheme in [14]). The virtual coincidence window
defined in software was 3.75ns, and we monitored the
accidental coincidences in an equally wide time window
offset by 20 ns. Detector time delay compensation was
adjusted to better than 0.5 ns to avoid leakage through a
classical timing channel [29].
The experimental results from one 9.5 hour run are
shown in Fig. 3. In this interval, we observe a small drop
of the coincidence rate due to an alignment drift in the
optical link. Accidental coincidences were about 0.5% of
the coincidences from down-converted photon pairs.
Half of the identified photon pairs were seen by detec-
tors (3,4,5,6) paired with (1’,2’,3’,4’), which were used to
evaluate the violation of (2). About a quarter of the pairs
in detector combinations (1,2) with (1’,2’) contributed to
the raw key, while the residual quarter of pairs in com-
binations (1,2) with (3’,4’) were discarded. Detectors
(1,2,1’,2’) were adjusted to coincide with the natural axes
of the down conversion crystal to keep the error rate on
the raw key as small as possible.
Error correction following a modified CASCADE pro-
tocol [30] was performed in real time on packets of at
least 10000 raw bits for a targeted final bit error ratio
of 10−12. The corresponding quantum bit error ratio
(QBER) was extracted out of this procedure (Fig. 3b).
The combined correlation value S was extracted via (3)
for that block of raw key, and stayed at around 2.5 over
the whole measurement time (Fig. 3c). This is not a
particularly high value, and we suspect a broad optical
spectrum in the blue pump diode as a reason for this
problem. This is compatible with lower polarization cor-
relation in the ±45◦ basis due to a residual distinguisha-
bility between the two decay paths in the SPDC process.
However, it serves as a typical model for an eavesdrop-
ping attempt e.g. by a partial intercept-resend attack in
the H/V basis. While such an attack is not revealed in
the QBER in this protocol, it clearly shows in a reduction
of S from the maximally expected value of 2
√
2.
The average information leakage l per raw bit to an
eavesdropper was estimated for each block following (1).
Together with the revealed bits in the error correction
procedure (and not assuming that any errors are due to
intrinsic detector noise), we can then establish the secret
key fraction Alice and Bob can extract out of the privacy
amplification hashing procedure from a given raw key
block. The result over time is shown in Fig. 3d, resulting
in an average final key rate of around 300 bit s−1 or about
107 bit of error-free secret key.
The estimation of the eavesdropper knowledge is appli-
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FIG. 3: Experimental results in a key distribution experiment
implementing an Ekert91 protocol. (a) shows total (upper
trace) and accidental (lower trace) detected coincidence rates
between Alice and Bob, (b) the error ration in the raw key,
(c) the degree of violation of a CHSH-type Bell inequality, (d)
the final key rate after error correction and privacy amplifica-
tion. The experiment was terminated by a storm misaligning
a telescope of the optical link at 5 am.
4cable strictly only for an infinitely large number of bits;
recent work on the security of finite length keys implies
that the privacy amplification should be carried out over
large ensembles [31, 32, 33]. For the protocol studied
here, a finite-key bound has been presented in Ref. [34].
By performing privacy amplification on blocks of n = 106
bits of the raw key, the extractable secure key is around
half of the asymptotic value [37].
Conclusion and perspectives. We have demonstrated a
free space implementation of a modified Ekert91 proto-
col. The security of the key distilled was derived from the
violation of the CHSH inequality. This ensured that the
key was distributed not by some arbitrary random num-
ber generator, but with the non-local correlations shared
by entangled photon-pairs.
Using Ekert91, the authorized parties can give up con-
trol over the photon source. Ac´ın et al. [21] showed that
the CHSH violation is in principle sufficient to decide the
security (against collective attacks) of a distributed key,
even if the measurement apparatus is not trusted. Unfor-
tunately, such a scheme is not yet experimentally feasible
because of the stringent requirement it places on detector
efficiencies [21, 35].
A final point must be made about the random choice
generator. Our implementation leaves this choice to the
beam splitter B1 in Fig. 2, which is accessible from
the quantum channel. We are then assuming that the
eavesdropper cannot change the beam splitter’s behav-
ior. This is reasonable; however, it makes our setup
fall outside the device-independent scenario, even in the
lossless regime. In particular, in that scenario, one can
construct a situation in which BB84 would not be se-
cure at all [36] because it is conceivable that different
states are sent to the different measurement devices; but
this is excluded for a well-behaved beam-splitter, which
is precisely our assumption. Device-independent secu-
rity requires the choice to be made on degrees of freedom
independent of those accessible to the eavesdropper.
Acknowledgment
This work was supported by the National Research
Foundation and the Ministry of Education, Singapore.
[1] C. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Computers, Systems and Sig-
nal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1984, pp. 175
- 179. (1984).
[2] S. Wiesner, Sigact News 15, 78 (1983).
[3] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and
J. Smolin, J. Cryptology 5, 3 (1992).
[4] W. K. Wooters andW. H. Zurek, Nature 299, 802 (1982).
[5] D. Dieks, Phys. Lett. A 92, 271 (1982).
[6] C. Bennett, G. Brassard, and C. Crepeau, and U. Mau-
rer, Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on 41, 1915
(1995), ISSN 0018-9448.
[7] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[8] J. S. Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys. 38, 447 (1966).
[9] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, and R. A. Holt,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 23, 880 (1969).
[10] V. Coffman, J. Kundu, and W. K. Wootters, Phys. Rev.
A 61, 052306 (2000).
[11] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[12] C. A. Fuchs, N. Gisin, R. B. Griffiths, C.-S. Niu, and
A. Peres, Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163 (1997).
[13] J. Bienfang, A. Gross, A. Mink, B. Hershman, A. Nakas-
sis, X. Tang, R. Lu, D. Su, C. Clark, C. Williams, et al.,
Opt. Express 12, 2011 (2004).
[14] I. Marckic, A. Lamas-Linares, and C. Kurtsiefer, Appl.
Phys. Lett. 89, 101122 (2006).
[15] M. Koashi, and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 90, 057902
(2003).
[16] X. Ma, C.-H. F. Fung, and H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 76,
012307 (2007).
[17] C. Kurtsiefer, P. Zarda, M. Halder, P.M. Gorman, P.R.
Tapster, J.G. Rarity, and H. Weinfurter, Proceedings
SPIE 4917, 25-31 (2002).
[18] G. Brassard, N. Lu¨tkenhaus, T. Mor, and B. C. Sanders,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 1330 (2000).
[19] W.-Y. Hwang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 057901 (2003).
[20] V. Scarani, A. Ac´ın, G. Ribordy, and N. Gisin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004).
[21] A. Acin, N. Brunner, N. Gisin, S. Massar, S. Pironio, and
V. Scarani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 230501 (2007).
[22] D.S. Naik, C.G. Peterson, A.G. White, A.J. Berglund,
P.G. Kwiat Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4733 (2000).
[23] W. Tittel, J. Brendel, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 84, 4737 (2000).
[24] T. Jennewein, C. Simon, G. Weihs, H. Weinfurter, and
A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4729 (2000).
[25] A. Ac´ın, S. Massar, S. Pironio, New J. Phys. 8, 126
(2006)
[26] P. G. Kwiat, K. Mattle, H. Weinfurter, A. Zeilinger, A. V.
Sergienko, and Y. Shih, Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 4337 (1995).
[27] C. Kurtsiefer, M. Oberparleiter, and H. Weinfurter,
Phys. Rev. A 64, 023802 (2001).
[28] P. Trojek, C. Schmid, M. Bourennane, H. Weinfurter,
and C. Kurtsiefer, Opt. Express 12, 276 (2004).
[29] A. Lamas-Linares and C. Kurtsiefer, Opt. Express 15,
9388 (2007).
[30] G. Brassard and L. Savail, in: Advances in Cryptology
- Proc. Eurocrypt ’94, pp. 410-423 (1994); T. Sugimoto
and K. Yamazaki, IEICE Trans. Fundamentals E38-A,
1987 (2000).
[31] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 72,
012326 (2005); X.-B. Wang, Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 230503
(2005).
[32] J. Hasegawa, M. Hayashi, T. Hiroshima, A. Tanaka, A.
Tomita, arXiv:0705.3081.
[33] V. Scarani, R.Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 200501
(2008)
[34] V. Scarani, R. Renner, arXiv:0806.0120
[35] Y. Zhao, C.-H. F. Fung, B. Qi, C. Chen, H.-K. Lo,
arXiv:0704.3253
[36] F. Magniez et al., quant-ph/0512111, Appendix A; A.
Ac´ın, N. Gisin, L. Masanes, Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 120405
5(2006); V. Scarani et al., Phys. Rev. A 74, 042339 (2006).
[37] Note that this value cannot be read from Fig. 1 in [34],
because that plot assumed (i) an a priori relation between
Q and S that is not fulfilled in the experiment and (ii)
the optimization of the probability of the measurements
as a function of N , while in the experiment the choices
are always made by 50:50 splitters.
